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Abstract: 
Brown v The State of Tasmania is an implied freedom of political 
communication challenge which was heard by the Full Bench of High 
Court in May 2017. The two Plaintiffs have impugned the constitutional 
validity of the Tasmanian ‘anti-protest’ legislation, the Workplaces 
(Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas). This article argues that the 
Act impermissibly infringes the constitutionally implied freedom of 
political communication because it does not pursue a legitimate legislative 
purpose under the second limb of the Lange test. In making this argument, 
it is submitted that in a graduated series of implied freedom challenges, 
Lange’s requirement that an impugned law pursue a legitimate legislative 
purpose has been significantly elevated by the High Court in the 20 years 
since. As such, the article fills a lacuna in the literature by exploring the 
content of this higher constitutional criterion of validity, focusing 
specifically on the reasoning of Hayne J in Monis v The Queen and the 
McCloy plurality’s recent articulation of the implied freedom’s 
‘protective’ function. The article then applies McCloy’s new test of 
structured proportionality and concludes that, even if the Act pursues a 
legitimate legislative purpose, it is not ‘necessary’ nor ‘adequate in its 
balance’. 
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‘In that sense it is said that because of that very fact, the very fact 
and the sole fact that they were engaging in political communication 
they are subject, not to the forest management regime but to this 
regime that imposes much greater penalties for - precisely for the act 
of political speech. That is really one way in which the case against 
you is put.’1 – Keane J to Mr Michael O’Farrell SC on 3 May 2017 
during day two of the hearing of Brown v The State of Tasmania  
I   INTRODUCTION 
This article argues that the Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 
2014 (Tas) (‘the Act’) infringes the constitutionally implied freedom of 
political communication under the test laid down in Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation.2 At the time of writing, the Full Bench of the 
High Court (‘the Court’) on 2–3 May 2017 heard a challenge to the Act’s 
validity in its original jurisdiction on the Special Case filed by the 
Plaintiffs, Dr Robert Brown and Ms Jessica Hoyt, in Brown v The State of 
Tasmania (‘Brown’).3 As is now settled, the Lange test protects 
communication about political matters as an indispensable incident of the 
Australian system of representative and responsible government by 
operating to invalidate legislation that impermissibly restricts such 
communication. It is argued that the Act impermissibly infringes this 
constitutional guarantee because it specifically targets and restricts 
‘political’ and ‘environmental’ protest that has a nexus to business 
premises, without an adequate justification for doing so. The Act targets 
and restricts the implied freedom by creating four principal types of 
offences, three of which operate to make protesting on a ‘political, 
environmental, social, cultural or economic’4 issue a mental element of the 
crime (crimes which are, by default, indictable offences).  
As such, the author argues in Part V that the Act is constitutionally invalid 
because it does not pursue a legitimate legislative purpose, as required by 
the Lange test. It is submitted that the requirement of legitimate purpose as 
a criterion of constitutional validity has increasingly been elevated by the 
Court in a graduated series of implied freedom challenges, including 
                                                     
1  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) 4445.  
2  (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 (‘Lange’).  
3  See Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 93 (2 
May 2017) and Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] 
HCATrans 94 (3 May 2017). The Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s submissions, along with 
submissions from the Attorneys-General intervening on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria are accessible at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_h3-2016. See also Jeremy Gans, ‘News: Forest 
challenge stumbles into a factual thicket’ on Opinions on High (5 May 2017) 
<http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2017/05/05/news-tasmanian-forest-
challenge-stumbles-into-a-factual-thicket/>.  
4  Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) s 4.  
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Coleman v Power,5 Monis v The Queen,6 Unions NSW v New South Wales7 
and now McCloy v New South Wales.8 This determination of legitimate 
purpose may be fatal to the Act because it is arguable that the ‘true’,9 or 
collateral, purpose behind the Act is to silence protest on particular political 
and environmental issues, namely protest related to the forest industry in 
Tasmania. Such a purpose (or at the very least the chilling effect it has had 
on political protest in Tasmania) exposes the Act’s incompatibility with the 
Australian system of representative and responsible government. Brown is 
also the Court’s first chance to apply the new three-tiered structured 
proportionality test it propounded in McCloy.10 As such, this article argues 
in Part VI that, even if the Act’s purpose is constitutionally valid, while the 
Act may be ‘suitable’, it is neither ‘necessary’ or ‘adequate in its balance’.11 
This is principally because there are at least 13 other coextensive criminal 
offences and torts that regulate similar conduct. The constitutional validity 
of the Act has only been subject to several shorter analyses,12 and as such 
this paper adds to the literature by offering a lengthier analysis.  
II   CONTEXT: FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE ACT’S 
OPERATION 
A   Entry into Force 
In December 2014 the Act came into force in Tasmania. It was introduced 
into Parliament by the Liberal Government to uphold their 2014 electoral 
promise to ‘protect workers from radical protesters’.13 Even before its 
enactment, the (then) Bill was subject to condemnation by a myriad of 
actors,14 including the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for 
                                                     
5  (2004) 220 CLR 1 (‘Coleman’). 
6  (2013) 249 CLR 92 (‘Monis’). 
7  (2013) 252 CLR 530 (‘Unions NSW’). 
8  (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’). 
9  Ibid 205 [40] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
10  Ibid 193–5 [2].  
11  Ibid.  
12  See Nicholas Aroney and Lorraine Finlay, ‘Protesting the anti-protest laws: will a 
constitutional challenge succeed?’ (2016) 31(3) Australian Environment Review 67; 
Aidan Ricketts, ‘Freedom From Political Communication’ (2015) 40 Alternative Law 
Journal 234; Greg Barns, ‘The Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 – an 
end to peaceful protests in Tasmania?’ (2014) 29(10) Australian Environment Review 
292; Peter Burdon and Mary Heath, Bob Brown takes to the High Court to put hardline 
anti-protest laws to the test (3 May 2017) The Conversation 
<http://theconversation.com/bob-brown-takes-to-the-high-court-to-put-hardline-anti-
protest-laws-to-the-test-76991>.   
13  Paul Harriss MP, Minister for Resources, ‘Protecting Workplaces from Radical 
Protesters’ (Media Release, 22 October 2014) 
<http://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/protecting_workers_from_radical_protesters>. 
14  See, eg, Michael Safi, ‘Tasmania’s anti-protest law slammed by former supreme court 
justice’, The Guardian (online) 29 October 2014 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/29/tasmanias-anti-protest-law-
slammed-by-former-supreme-court-judge>; Human Rights law Centre, Tasmania's 
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Human Rights (OHCHR), which issued a statement noting the Bill’s 
enactment would ‘have the chilling effect of silencing dissenters and 
outlawing speech protected by international human rights law.’15 The Bill 
proposed that persons convicted of a second or repeat against the Act would 
face mandatory terms of imprisonment of three months.  
Since coming into force (without mandatory penalties), the Act has been 
subject to extensive criticism for the central reason that it criminalises 
political protest in public places (‘business access areas’16), with penalties 
of up to $10 000 per individual and terms of imprisonment for further 
offences.17 At the time, Professor George Williams correctly predicted that 
the Act was ‘susceptible to challenge in the High Court’.18 Forest industry 
groups, peak business bodies and mining companies welcomed the new 
offences however, as the Act was seen as a measured response to 
continuing destructive behaviour directed at various primary industries 
including mining and forestry.19 
B   Charges Laid under the Act and the High Court Challenge Heard 
In January 2016, two protesters (one of whom was Ms Hoyt) were arrested 
and charged under the Act after failing to comply with police directions to 
leave Forestry Tasmania land at Lapoinya.20 A few days later Doctor 
Brown was arrested, charged and bailed under s 6(4) of the Act, after he 
also failed to comply with police directions to leave a ‘business access 
area’. A further two protesters were subsequently charged. In March 2016, 
Doctor Brown issued a writ in the High Court’s original jurisdiction, 
challenging the Act’s constitutional validity. During this period the five 
accused were still subject to their bail conditions. In May and June 2016, 
Tasmania Police dropped the charges against Doctor Brown and the four 
other protesters, acting on advice from the Department of Public 
                                                     
Proposed Anti-Protest Laws WilI Breach International Human Rights Law (29 October 
2014) <http://hrlc.org.au/tasmanias-proposed-anti-protest-laws-will-breach-
international-human-rights-law/>.  
15  OHCHR, UN Experts Urge Tasmania to Drop its Anti-Protest Bill (9 September 2014) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15002&L
angID=E>. 
16  Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) ss 3, 5.  
17  See, eg, Brendan Gogarty, Criminalising dissent: anti-protest law is an ominous sign 
of the times (28 November 2014) The Conversation 
<https://theconversation.com/criminalising-dissent-anti-protest-law-is-an-ominous-
sign-of-the-times-34790>. 
18  Michael Safi, ‘Tasmania to focus anti-protest laws on anti-forestry and mining 
activists’, The Guardian (online) 28 October 2014 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/28/tasmania-to-narrow-anti-protest-
laws-to-target-anti-forestry-and-mining-activists>.  
19  See, eg, Nick Thomas and Tom Dougherty, Protection from protest: a new standard to 
minimise business disruption in Tasmania (11 December 2014) Clayton Utz 
<https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2014/december/protection-from-protest-a-
new-standard-to-minimise-business-disruption-in-tasmania>. 
20   Ostensibly a designated ‘business premises’ under s 3 of the Act.  
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Prosecutions; the reason being that it was too difficult to determine whether 
he was on a business access area or business premises. After early 
skirmishes about whether the Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act’s 
validity,21 the Full Court heard argument on the Special Case over two days 
on 2–3 May 2017.  
C   The Act’s Stated Purpose  
The construction of the Act’s legislative purpose is the starting point in 
assessing its constitutional validity.22 The determination of legislative 
purpose is anchored in the permissible intrinsic and extrinsic aids of 
construction, read in conjunction with the operation and effect of the Act’s 
provisions. The Second Reading Speech of the Act is a permissible 
extrinsic aid available in the construction of statutory purpose.23  
During the Second Reading Speech in the House of Assembly (the lower 
house in Tasmania), the Minister for Resources Mr Paul Harriss MP 
opened with the statement that the Government had introduced the (then) 
Bill ‘to rebalance the scales’,24 in light of the decades-long running battles 
between the forestry industry and environmental activist groups in 
Tasmania. The Minister went on to state that there were three primary 
policy objectives of the Bill, which were to: 
 deter protests that seek to intentionally shut down and harm Tasmanian 
businesses’ capacity to build productive commercial enterprises, 
through new offences and robust penalties; 
 ensure Tasmanians can go to work and run their businesses in a safe 
manner, free from interference and disruption; and  
 protect and support the continued right to free speech and the right to 
protest.25 
Notably, deterrence appears to have been a primary purpose of the 
legislation. This is also clear from the subsequently enacted legislation’s 
Long Title, which states the Act’s purpose is: ‘to ensure that protesters do 
not damage business premises or business-related objects, or prevent, 
impede or obstruct the carrying out of business activities on business 
premises, and for related purposes.’26 
 
                                                     
21  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2016] HCATrans 152 (7 
July 2016); Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2016] 
HCATrans 271 (14 November 2016). 
22  See, eg, McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 203 [31], 212–13 [67].  
23  Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s 8B(3)(f). 
24  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 26 June 2014, 26 (Paul 
Harriss, Minister for Resources). 
25  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 26 June 2014, 26 (Paul 
Harriss, Minister for Resources) 26–7. 
26  Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) Long Title.  
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D   Summary of The Act’s Operative Offence Provisions 
1 Operative offence provisions  
The Act operates to create ten criminal offences, nine of which are 
indictable by default.27 The four classes of offence created in Part 2 of the 
Act are:  
(i) invading or hindering business (s 6); 
(ii) causing or threatening damage or a risk to safety (s 7); 
(iii) remaining on a ‘business access area’28 after being directed to leave 
by a police officer (s 8); and  
(iv) preventing the removal of obstructions (s 9). 
For the first three types of offence, the s 4 definition of a ‘protester’ means 
that protesting on a ‘political, environmental, social, cultural or economic’ 
issue becomes a mental element of the offence. The key offence provisions 
are sub-ss 6(4) (preventing, hindering or obstructing business), 8(1)(a) and 
8(1)(b) (remaining on, or returning to, a business access area after being 
issued with a direction to leave), which are all triggered by a police officer 
issuing a direction under sub-s 11(1) to a person to move from business 
premises or a business access area if the police officer reasonably believes 
the person has, or is likely to commit, an offence against the Act. The Court 
squarely focused its attention during the hearing of Brown on the breadth 
of this power conferred upon police.29 Section 7 creates three offences 
relating to causing or threatening damage or a risk to safety, which do not 
require the same ‘move on’ direction trigger under sub-s 11(1).  
A range of penalties are prescribed for contravention of these offences, 
including fines, pecuniary compensation and imprisonment.30 All of the 
offences in the Act are indictable except for the offence created by s 10(2); 
however, all offences may be heard summarily.31 Section 16(3) provides 
that for a number of offences created by the Act (including ss 6(4) and 
8(1)), if these are prosecuted summarily, then the applicable penalties are 
reduced significantly. 
2 Interpretation of ‘business access area’  
One of the most contentious aspects of the Act’s operation is its extension 
of all four principal types of offence to what is defined as a ‘business access 
area’. Section 3 defines a business access area as being:  
so much of an area of land (including but not limited to any 
road, footpath or public place), that is outside the business 
premises, as is reasonably necessary to enable access to an 
entrance to, or to an exit from, the business premises… 
                                                     
27  Ibid s 16(1). 
28  Ibid s 3.  
29  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) [4075]–[4110], [4550], [7265].  
30  Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) s 17(2).  
31  Ibid s 16(2). 
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It is argued that this geographic definition is the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ in the Act with respect to its application to a wide range of 
protest types – it encompasses publicly accessible areas and, as such, 
operates to extend the Act’s offences to a wide variety of locales, including 
access roads to Forestry Tasmania land. The nebulous definition attracted 
criticism from the Police Association of Tasmania, which said that police 
officers ‘don’t carry surveying tools for a living, and that’s what you would 
actually need to interpret that law’.32 
III   THE LANGE TEST: THE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPLIED 
FREEDOM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
It is now ‘well settled’33 that in Lange a unanimous Court confirmed that 
implied into the Australian Constitution is a restriction on both 
Commonwealth and State34 legislative power that guarantees freedom of 
political communication in the Australian system of representative and 
responsible government.35 The constitutional implication arises from ss 7, 
24 and 128 of the Constitution, which function to ensure that the members 
of the two Houses of Parliament are directly chosen by the people – the 
implied freedom of political communication therefore protects the people’s 
‘free and informed choice as electors.’36 As reasoned by the plurality in 
Unions NSW, this means that ‘political communication is an indispensable 
incident of that system of representative government for which the 
Constitution provides.’37 
The fundamental basis of the implication was earlier explained by Mason 
CJ in one of the embryonic implied freedom challenges, Australian Capital 
Television Limited v Commonwealth.38 His Honour held that the implied 
freedom is a necessary incident of Australia’s system of representative and 
responsible government because: ‘Only by exercising that freedom can the 
citizen criticise government decisions and actions, seek to bring about 
change, call for action where none has been taken and in this way influence 
the elected Representatives.’39 
The Court held in Lange that the test for determining whether a law 
infringes this guarantee is:  
                                                     
32  Richard Baines, ‘Tasmanian officers could boycott workplace protest laws: police 
association’, The Mercury (online) 4 June 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-
04/tasmania-police-could-boycott-workplace-protest-laws/7477936>.  
33  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 200 [23] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
34  The restriction on State legislative power was confirmed by the plurality in Unions 
NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530 at 548–51 [17]–[26].  
35  Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567.  
36  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 548 [17] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and 
Bell JJ).  
37  Ibid.    
38  (1992) 177 CLR 106 (‘ACTV’). 
39  Ibid 138.  
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First, does the law effectively burden freedom of 
communication about government or political matters either in 
its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the law effectively 
burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government…40 
The plurality in McCloy re-affirmed that this two-limbed test in Lange still 
stands as the ‘authoritative statement of the test to be applied to determine 
whether a law contravenes the freedom.’41 The content of the test has 
evolved throughout the implied freedom jurisprudence,42 and now it is 
settled that the second limb as laid down in Lange has two ‘arms’. These 
are that: (i) the Court must determine whether a law pursues a legitimate 
legislative purpose compatible with the system of representative and 
responsible government; and (ii), if the purpose is so compatible, then 
whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve that 
purpose. This paper will now sequentially consider both limbs (and each 
arm) of the Lange test to assess the Act’s constitutional validity. 
IV   APPLYING LANGE’S FIRST LIMB: DOES THE ACT 
EFFECTIVELY BURDEN THE IMPLIED FREEDOM? 
A   ‘Effective Burden’ 
The first limb of the Lange test is the determination of whether the Act, in 
its terms, operation and effect, effectively burdens the implied freedom of 
communication about political matters in Australia.43 Hayne J’s 
articulation of the meaning of ‘effective burden’ in Monis has been 
subsequently approved by Keane J in Unions NSW,44 and most recently by 
Gageler J in McCloy.45 Hayne J explained in Monis that: ‘the expression 
“effectively burden” means nothing more complicated than that the effect 
of the law is to prohibit, or put some limitation on, the making or content 
of political communication’.46 North J’s finding in Muldoon v Melbourne 
City Council47 is also apposite on this point: his Honour held that the 
effective burden requirement ‘operates as a low-level filter so that plainly 
inconsequential impediments will not needlessly require an examination of 
                                                     
40  Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. 
41  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 200–1 [23] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
42  See modification in Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, where McHugh J at 50 [92] extended 
the legitimate ends enquiry to an impugned law’s ‘manner of achieving’ its end.  
43  Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567.   
44  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 574 [119].  
45  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 230 [126]. 
46  Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 142 [108].  
47  (2013) 217 FCR 450 (‘Muldoon’). 
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the more complex inquiries involved in answering the second Lange 
question.’48 
B   The Act’s Burden On The Implied Freedom 
One of the seminal statements as to when a law will burden the implied 
freedom was expounded by McHugh J in Coleman. His Honour stated that: 
‘[i]n all but exceptional cases, a law will not burden such communications 
unless, by its operation or practical effect, it directly and not remotely 
restricts or limits the content of those communications or the time, place, 
manner or conditions of their occurrence.’49 The Act here does so burden 
the freedom because it directly restricts where, when and how protests may 
be conducted – explicitly limiting the time, place and conditions of political 
communication.  
There are three reasons why the Act directly restricts such communication. 
First, ss 4(1) and 4(2) of the Act interoperate to expressly define a 
‘protester’ as a person engaging in protest about a ‘political, 
environmental, social, cultural or economic’50 issue. The s 4 definition is 
the cornerstone of the two offences created by ss 6 and 7. As such, the 
second and primary reason the Act burdens the implied freedom is that it 
creates these default indictable offences for engaging in particular types of 
conduct as a political protester. On this point, Levy v State of Victoria51 
arguably stands for the proposition that the criminalisation of political 
protest is an archetypal instance of a burden being placed on the freedom.52  
Third, applying McHugh J’s statement of principle in Coleman, the Act 
restricts both: (i) the ‘place’ in which protest may occur, as it prohibits 
protest on ‘business premises’ and ‘business access areas’; and (ii) the 
‘time’ when protest can occur, as s 6(4) prevents a person from returning 
to the relevant area for three months from the date the direction is issued. 
Putting the effect of this temporal restriction at its highest, s 6(4) in effect 
prevents a person from returning to a business access area to ‘prevent, 
hinder or obstruct’ business by protesting for a further three months under 
pain of an aggravated penalty of a term of imprisonment of up to four years 
or a $10 000 fine for committing such a ‘further offence’. As such, it is 
almost certain that the Act imposes an effective burden on the freedom.  
 
                                                     
48  Ibid 526 [369]. 
49  Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 49 [91]. 
50  Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) s 4(2). 
51  (1997) 189 CLR 579 (‘Levy’). 
52  Ibid 625–6 (McHugh J). 
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V    APPLYING THE FIRST ARM OF LANGE’S SECOND LIMB: ARE 
THE PURPOSE AND MEANS OF THE ACT LEGITIMATE? 
(‘COMPATIBILITY TESTING’) 
A   The Current Formulation and McCloy’s Two Implications 
This latest evolution of the first arm of the second limb of the test is its re-
statement by the plurality in McCloy and their Honours’ attendant 
reasoning. In McCloy, the plurality designated the term ‘compatibility 
testing’ for this arm and explained:  
If “yes” to question 1, are the purpose of the law and the means adopted 
to achieve that purpose legitimate, in the sense that they are compatible 
with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative government? This question reflects what is referred to 
in these reasons as “compatibility testing”.  
The answer to that question will be in the affirmative if the purpose of 
the law and the means adopted are identified and are compatible with 
the constitutionally prescribed system in the sense that they do not 
adversely impinge upon the functioning of the system of representative 
government.53 
This current formulation of this stage of the Lange test forms part of the 
ratio decidendi of McCloy. It is submitted that there are two key 
implications for this arm of the test arising from the plurality’s reasoning.  
The first implication for the legitimate ends inquiry is that the function of 
compatibility testing has been further clarified.54 This is because their 
Honours articulated the doctrinal foundation of ‘compatibility testing’. 
Compatibility testing was held to be a higher ‘rule derived from the 
Constitution itself’,55 as opposed to being simply a judicial tool to 
determine the ‘rationality and reasonableness of the legislative 
restriction’.56 Proportionality testing under the second arm of the second 
limb is such a judicial tool. The plurality, by elevating compatibility 
testing’s doctrinal foundation to that of a constitutionally derivative rule, 
expressly characterised its function to be that of a ‘protective’57 gatekeeper. 
This gatekeeping function ensures the ‘[implied] freedom is protective of 
the constitutionally mandated system of representative government’.58 
Despite not agreeing with the plurality’s differentiation between a tool used 
to determine reasonableness and a higher rule derived from the 
                                                     
53  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 193–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) 
(footnotes omitted).  
54  See Shipra Chordia, ‘Proportionality and McCloy v New South Wales: close but not 
quite?’ on AUSPUBLAW (1 March 2016) 
<https://auspublaw.org/2016/3/proportionality-and-mccloy/>. 
55  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 213 [68] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid.   
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Constitution,59 Chordia argues that this articulation of the basis of 
compatibility testing means that the plurality sought to cast light on the 
‘actual analysis undertaken at this stage irrespective of the language 
employed to describe the [compatibility] test.’60 
As such, Chordia posits that the actual analysis undertaken by the Court 
during compatibility testing is to determine what the ‘true purpose of the 
law’ is.61 This accords with the plurality’s reasoning in McCloy, as their 
Honours took, in essence, a substance over form approach. As argued by 
Chordia: ‘[i]n effect, the majority is concerned here with “smoking out” 
whether there is another, ulterior purpose that may be hiding behind the 
asserted or obvious one.’62 This approach indicates that the Court may now 
be more willing to untether itself from the restraints imposed by the Act’s 
stated purpose, and move towards making a determination about the Act’s 
real purpose. On day two of the hearing of Brown, Gageler J put this point 
to Mr Bleby SC (appearing for South Australia) when his Honour said: 
You would accept, I think, that it is possible to look beyond the face of the 
legislation, that is, Parliament cannot recite itself into power and it cannot 
recite itself out of a constraint of power.63 
Gageler J’s point was in response to Mr Bleby SC’s submission that the 
Court’s construction of the Act’s purpose should proceed from the basis 
that ‘Parliament can respond’ to ‘felt necessities’, namely ‘protestors who 
pose or carry that risk of disruption, damage, threat and the like’.64 
Therefore on Mr Bleby SC’s submission, the purpose of the Act (however 
variously expressed by the Defendant or interveners) is to target this 
mischief, which does not ‘elevate silencing protestors to an object of the 
Act’.65  
However, this paper submits that McCloy has opened the door a little wider 
for precisely such normative curial determinations about a law’s true 
purpose to be made because the protective gatekeeping function of 
compatibility testing has been elevated. If this proposition is accepted, this 
means that it is more likely that the Court in Brown will scrutinise whether 
or not silencing protestors could be a purpose of the Act. Meager, Simpson, 
Stellios and Wheeler’s analysis of McCloy supports this argument that the 
                                                     
59  See Anne Carter, ‘Political Donations, Political Communication and the Place of 
Proportionality Analysis’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 245, 248. 
60  Chordia, above n 54 (emphasis added).  
61  Ibid. Chordia argues such true purpose is ‘construed from both its stated objective 
(end) and its practical and legal operation (means)’. 
62  Chordia, above n 54.  
63  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) 7260. For the avoidance of doubt, this discussion on the elevation of 
compatibility testing in McCloy and ulterior purpose appeared in the author’s original 
honours manuscript. 
64  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) 7130.  
65  Ibid. 
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plurality in McCloy further elevated the legitimate end inquiry – the authors 
argue that the plurality’s clarification about the function of compatibility 
testing means there is a shift in the Court towards determining the ‘true’66 
purpose of an impugned law.  
McCloy’s second implication is that the plurality placed a heightened 
importance on the identification of an impugned law’s legitimate purpose. 
This implication is a corollary of the first implication, and arises from the 
plurality’s articulation in McCloy of the threshold required to establish 
whether a law has a legitimate purpose. The plurality explained that 
proportionality, when used as a tool to determine the constitutional validity 
of laws in comparative countries, will usually determine legitimacy by 
reference to the extent of the grant of legislative power permitted by the 
relevant constitution. The critical difference between such comparative 
approaches and the Lange test is that the latter 
requires more, both as to what qualifies as legitimate, and as to what must 
meet this qualification. It requires, at the outset, that consideration be given 
to the purpose of the legislative provisions and the means adopted to 
achieve that purpose in order to determine whether the provisions are 
directed to, or operate to, impinge upon the functionality of the system of 
representative government. If this is so, no further inquiry is necessary. The 
result will be constitutional invalidity.67  
By emphasising that ‘more’ is required of the legitimate object, the 
plurality has re-articulated the importance of compatibility testing. 
Supporting this proposition is Professor Stone’s argument pre-McCloy that 
in the Court’s recent implied freedom jurisprudence there has been a 
concentration on the question of whether the law has a legitimate end. 
Professor Stone wrote in 2014 that: ‘[m]ethodologically, the attention to 
the question of ‘legitimate end’ rather than the other aspects of the test 
(such as the ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted criterion’) appears to be 
something of a trend.’68 Professor Stone posited that the lineage of cases 
bearing out this trend was Coleman, Monis and Unions NSW (to which 
McCloy can now be added).  
Throughout the implied freedom jurisprudence, the curial determination of 
legitimate purpose has not often been a live issue, or been seriously 
challenged by litigants, with the vast majority of challenges mounted on 
the second arm of the second limb. That is, challenges relating to legislation 
                                                     
66  Dan Meagher, Amelia Simpson, James Stellios and Fiona Wheeler, Hanks Australian 
Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (LexisNexis, 10th ed, 2016) 1231 
[10.3.43].  
67  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 212–13 [67] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) 
(emphasis added).  
68  Adrienne Stone, ‘The High Court Strikes Down a Campaign Finance Law 
(Again): Unions NSW v New South Wales’ on Opinions on High (14 May 2014) 
<http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2014/05/14/stone-unions-nsw>. 
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not using means proportionate to, or connected with, legitimate ends.69 
Indeed in Levy, the seminal implied freedom case regarding protest laws 
(which were found to be valid), each Justice found that impugned 
Regulations 5 and 6 were ultimately directed at legitimate ends – namely, 
to ensure both public and individual safety during the start of the duck 
hunting season.70 In addition, both of the two recent implied freedom 
protest cases (Kerrison v Melbourne City Council71 and O’Flaherty v City 
of Sydney Council 72) found the impugned laws to have a legitimate end. 
However, it is instructive that three Justices in Levy left open the possibility 
that the Victorian legislature may have had a collateral statutory purpose 
in enacting the laws. To illustrate, Brennan CJ held that there had been no 
grounds put forward by the Plaintiff ‘challenging the truthfulness of the 
declaration in Reg 1(a) that the objective [of the Regulations] was the 
ensuring of a greater degree of safety of persons’.73  
B    ‘Legitimate End’ As A Higher Criterion Of Constitutional Validity 
The plurality’s reasoning in McCloy accords with Hayne J’s (relatively) 
recent explanation in Monis about the fundamental role legitimate purpose 
plays in the Lange test. Hayne J held that simply identifying the ‘end or 
ends the impugned law seeks to serve’74 is ‘necessary, but not sufficient’75 
when determining legislative validity under the Lange test. This is because 
‘not every object or end pursued by a law will justify burdening the 
freedom’.76 The crux of Hayne J’s reasoning is that the curial determination 
of what is ‘legitimate’ is a normative independent judgment about 
compatibility with the Australian constitutional system of government that 
is informed by, but not tethered to, the ‘end or ends that the impugned law 
seeks to achieve’.77  
To this end, Hayne J reasoned that simply ‘any end’78 asserted to be 
‘conducive to the public interest’79 would not satisfy this higher 
constitutional criterion of legitimate end – the Court must go further and 
explain how the asserted end ‘has a connection and is compatible with the 
constitutionally prescribed system of government and with the freedom of 
                                                     
69  For example, in Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508 (‘Tajjour’), at 509 
the plaintiffs conceded that s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) had the legitimate 
end of preventing or impeding criminal conduct.  
70  Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 596 (Brennan CJ), 609 (Dawson J), 614–5 (Toohey and 
Gummow JJ), 619–20 (Gaudon J), 627 (McHugh J), 648 (Kirby J). 
71  (2014) 228 FCR 87, 104 [73] (‘Kerrison’).  
72  (2014) 221 FCR 382, 385–6 [15]–[17] (‘O’Flaherty’). 
73  Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 599 (emphasis added). See also Gaudron J at 619 and 
McHugh J at 627.  
74  Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 147 [125].  
75  Ibid 148 [126]. 
76  Ibid.   
77  Ibid 147 [125]. 
78  Ibid 149 [130]. 
79  Ibid.  
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political communication which is its necessary incident.’80 The plurality in 
Unions NSW referenced Hayne J’s reasoning in Monis and stated: ‘[t]he 
discussion in the reasons in Monis as to the provision’s purpose serves to 
confirm the importance that the identification of statutory purpose has to 
the resolution of the second limb of the Lange test.’81 The headnote of the 
Unions NSW judgment stated that Hayne J’s reasoning in Monis at [125] 
was ‘applied’ in the plurality’s finding in Unions NSW that impugned 
provisions did not have a legitimate purpose.82 On this point, Professor 
Twomey, writing pre-McCloy, has argued that: ‘it must be recognised that 
the point of the proportionality test is to expose those cases where a 
“legitimate end” is a mere ruse to achieve quite a different end and to 
burden the implied freedom.’83  
C   No Legitimate Purpose For the Two Impugned Provisions in 
Unions NSW 
The only High Court authority to render a law invalid (albeit only partly 
invalid) on the basis that it did not have a legitimate purpose compatible 
with the Australian constitutional system of government is Unions NSW. 
As neatly summarised by Professor Stellios, neither impugned provision in 
that case ‘revealed a legitimate purpose or could be connected with the 
broader anti-corruption purposes of the Act.’84 Reflecting the weight of 
implied freedom jurisprudence, which has to date mostly accepted the 
stated statutory purpose as a legitimate end, the plurality started their 
substantive reasoning as to legitimacy of purpose with the proposition that: 
‘[t]he identification of the true purpose of a statutory provision which 
restricts a constitutionally guaranteed freedom is not often a matter of 
difficulty.’85 This statement is important not only because it recognises that 
the identification of the ‘true purpose’86 of an impugned law is the primary 
function of the legitimate ends inquiry, but the use of the word ‘true’ also 
implies that this inquiry may also reveal the law to have, on closer 
inspection, a collateral or illegitimate purpose.87    
Section 96D’s operation and effect in Unions NSW was found to be that it 
‘effectively denies the making of a political donation by anyone other than 
an elector’.88 The plurality went on to find that s 96D was ‘selective in its 
                                                     
80  Ibid.  
81  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 557 [50]. 
82  Ibid 531.  
83  Anne Twomey, ‘Before the High Court – McCloy v New South Wales: Developer 
Donations and the Buying of Influence’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 275, 280. 
84  James Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (The Federation Press, 6th 
ed, 2015) 572. 
85  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 556 [47] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and 
Bell JJ). 
86  Ibid.  
87  Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 599 (Brennan CJ). See also Gaudron J at 619 and McHugh 
J at 627.  
88  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 546 [11]. 
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prohibition. Yet the basis for this selection was not identified and is not 
apparent.’89 That is, s 96D was selective because it applied to all legal 
persons (including persons not enrolled, corporations and other entities) 
other than enrolled electors. On this point, the plurality reasoned that s 96D 
stopped ‘just short of a complete prohibition upon political donations. A 
complete prohibition might be understood to further, and therefore to share, 
the anti-corruption purposes of the EFED Act.’90 Put another way, a 
complete prohibition would have made it more likely that s 96D could have 
been constitutionally valid.  
Applying this logic, if the Act here had covered the field and applied to all 
persons, as opposed to just protesters, then this would likely have militated 
in favour of validity. That is, like the selective prohibition in s 96D, it is 
submitted there is no principled basis identified in the Act for the selective 
targeting of protesters rather than persons. This selectivity raises the 
fundamental question of why protest has been specifically targeted to the 
exclusion of other behaviours that have precisely the same effect on 
workplaces’ economic efficiency by preventing, hindering or obstructing 
business activity. Take the following examples, which would not constitute 
an offence under the Act: (i) persons loitering at a business entrance, 
harassing employees in the pursuit of a personal or individual grievance; 
(ii) a group of street performers haranguing workers at an exit from a 
workplace; and (iii) employees of neighbouring business obstructing 
access to a business entrance without permission, in order to carry out 
construction works on the front of the neighbouring business.  
The Act could have ameliorated this selectivity by including a wide, non-
exhaustive definition of ‘persons’ as including ‘protesters’ as well as other 
persons having the prescribed effect on business activities. Gordon J 
expressly raised this point on day two of the hearing of Brown (in the 
context of the necessity stage of structured proportionality):  
Is it not here, when one looks at this Act, in terms of looking at alternatives, 
to say it would be simple just to have the Workplaces (Protection from 
Protesters) Act remove all references to “protesters” and substitute 
“person” for “protester”?91   
The most pressing counter-argument in response to this point is that there 
are additional linkages in the ss 6 and 8 offences which connects them to 
the wider purpose the Act seeks to address; that is, linkages over and above 
what was missing in s 96D in Unions NSW. This argument goes to the point 
                                                     
89  Ibid 558 [53].  
90  Ibid 559 [59].  
91  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) 5545. For the avoidance of doubt, this discussion concerning reference only 
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of rational connection and is discussed below under the ‘suitability’ stage 
of structured proportionality.92  
Section 95G(6) was the second impugned provision found invalid in 
Unions NSW on the basis of illegitimate purpose. In effect, it severely 
restricted the amount of money that could be donated by the Labor Party 
and its affiliated unions.93 As suggested by Professor Stone, Keane J in 
Unions NSW (in broad agreement with the plurality) perhaps best 
articulates why s 95G(6) did not have a legitimate purpose. By operating 
to aggregate the amount spent by affiliates of political parties and thereby 
having a significant effect on the Labor Party, Keane J held that: 
The effect of this differential treatment is to distort the free flow 
of political communication by favouring entities … To 
discriminate between sources of political communication in this 
way is to distort the flow of political communication.94 
D   Whether The Act Has A Legitimate Object 
The argument in favour of validity is the characterisation of the Act’s 
legitimate object as the protection of workplaces from damage and 
disruption from protesters (the ‘orthodox purpose’). However, it is 
submitted that there are three principal arguments that militate against such 
a characterisation. These three arguments demonstrate that under Lange, 
regardless of whether Act’s stated purpose is conducive to the public 
interest, it does not satisfy the higher constitutional criterion of legitimate 
end, exposing its incompatibility with Australia’s system of representative 
and responsible government. These three arguments are that: (i) the Act 
expressly criminalises ‘political’ and ‘environmental’ protest; (ii) the s 5 
definition of ‘business premises’ means the offences discriminate against 
particular types of protest; and (iii) the conduct targeted by the Act is 
already regulated by 13 coextensive criminal offences and torts, with 
penalties set at lower thresholds for these existing offences.  
Set against these are three of the principal arguments in favour of validity: 
(i) that any such attacks on the Act’s validity confuse its ‘effect’ with its 
‘overall purpose’; (ii) any reliance on Unions NSW to impugn the Act’s 
legislative purpose fails to take into consideration that Unions NSW only 
invalidated individual provisions of an Act, not the entire legislative 
purpose, the latter being a more onerous challenge for a litigant; and (iii) 
in relation to the offences created by ss 6 and 8, the Act does not prohibit 
protests per se, but operates only on those that have the prescribed effect 
                                                     
92  These linkages are: (i) the geographic restrictions to business premises; and (ii) the 
calibration of targeting protest activity that only has the prescribed effect on business 
activity. 
93  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 561 [64]. 
94  Ibid 586 [167]. 
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of preventing, hindering or obstructing business activity on business 
premises.  
1 Act operates to expressly criminalise ‘political’ and ‘environmental’ 
protest 
The principal argument is that the Act operates to expressly criminalise 
‘political’ and ‘environmental’ protest by way of the s 4 definition of a 
‘protester’. Aroney and Finlay, who conclude that the Act will be likely be 
found constitutionally valid, acknowledge that this definition to ‘single out 
protest activities is likely to invite exacting scrutiny from the Court’.95 
Directly on this point, Brennan CJ in Levy held: 
A law which simply denied an opportunity to make such a [non-
verbal] protest about an issue relevant to the government or 
politics of the Commonwealth would be as offensive to the 
constitutionally implied freedom as a law which banned 
political speech-making on that issue.96 
Brennan CJ is reasoning from the proposition that laws that restrict political 
protest are prima facie illegitimate and require a very strong justification, 
because such a primary mode of legislative operation (that is, restricting 
political protest) is inherently incompatible with the system of responsible 
government.97 The proposition that a law banning or restricting political 
protest will be illegitimate under the Lange test is an implication arising 
from Brennan CJ’s use of the word ‘offensive’.  
By specifically prohibiting political communication, the operation of the 
Act here is sharply distinguished from the provisions found to be 
constitutionally valid in O’Flaherty v City of Sydney Council.98 There, the 
impugned Act conferred power on Council Officers to issue notices 
prohibiting people from staying overnight or camping in Martin Place in 
Sydney, and it was a criminal offence if the person failed to comply. The 
plaintiff in that case was a political protester who was part of the ‘Occupy 
Sydney’ movement that had occupied Martin Place. On appeal, Edmonds, 
Tracey and Flick JJ in a unanimous judgment upheld Katzmann J’s finding 
that the law did not impermissibly burden the implied freedom.99 Their 
Honours found that the law was ‘facially neutral’ because it did not ‘seek 
to prohibit the communication of “government or political matters”.’100 
Here, the Act is not so ‘facially neutral’: three of the four principal offences 
operate on ‘political’ protestors (with ss 6 and 7 applying exclusively only 
to ‘protesters’). 
                                                     
95  Aroney and Finlay, above n 12, 69. 
96  Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 595 (emphasis added).  
97  See also Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 52 [98] (McHugh J); Unions NSW (2013) 252 
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Allied to this is the fact that the effect of the s 4 definition is to ensure that 
‘political communication itself becomes effectively part of the mental 
element of the offence’.101 It follows that, interfacing Hayne J’s articulation 
of legitimate object being a higher criterion of constitutional validity with 
McCloy’s elucidation that this stage of the test has a protective gatekeeping 
function, the Act’s criminalisation of political protest effects a general 
deterrence of a critical method of participation in society which is an 
‘indispensable incident’102 of the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative and responsible government. Whilst not necessarily leading 
to constitutional invalidity, it is submitted that this general deterrence goes 
to the core of what is protected from legislative control under the implied 
freedom. Given the value placed by the Court on the freedom of political 
communication,103 it is submitted that the protection of business activities 
from disruption fails to justify this significant burden on the freedom, 
meaning that the Act impermissibly infringes it for want of a legitimate 
object. 
2 Specifically targeting ‘mining’, ‘forestry’, ‘agriculture’ and 
‘manufacturing’ in the s 5 definition of ‘business premises’ 
Before the Act came into force, Professor Stone was quoted as holding 
reservations about its specific targeting of ‘certain types of workplaces’, 
namely ‘mining workplaces, forestry workplaces, agriculture and food 
producers’,104 raising the question of ‘whether this is absolutely targeted 
towards the environment movement’.105 If so, Professor Stone commented 
that this would give rise to the argument that the Act is ‘not really directed 
to a legitimate end … that it’s really directed to favouring the 
government’.106 These concerns are not ameliorated by the Act in its 
current form because it still specifically enumerates each of these types of 
workplaces as falling within the ambit of the s 5 definition of ‘business 
premises’ in sub-ss (a)–(d). As such, an open construction (‘the first 
construction’) of s 5 is that, by applying the common law presumption of 
ejusdem generis, these first four sub-ss of s 5 limit the following general 
ones (the general provisions regard premises used as ‘shop, market or 
warehouse’ and premises related to the primary uses enumerated in sub-ss 
(a)–(e)). The opposing argument is that the first four sub-ss in (a)–(d) do 
not establish a genus which qualifies sub-ss (e) and (f), which are both 
                                                     
101  Ricketts, above n 12, 238.  
102  Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 
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expressed in general terms.107 It is submitted that the first construction is 
more likely to be adopted by the Court because there is a quantitative focus 
in s 5 on industries which have historically been affected by political and 
environmental protest action in Tasmania. 
On this first construction, applying the reasoning of both the plurality and 
Keane J in Unions NSW with respect to the discriminatory operation of the 
two provisions found there to be invalid, the entire Act can be characterised 
as discriminating against particular protests with a nexus to mining, 
forestry, agricultural and manufacturing workplaces. Keane J found that s 
95G operated such that ‘certain sources of political communication are 
treated differently from others.’108 The distortive effect this had on the 
system of representative and responsible government necessitated that the 
purpose of the provision was invalid. Indeed, here, after the public 
consultations on the proposed Bill, Paul Harriss MP noted that a number 
of further defined types of premises (such as residential) were removed 
from the s 5 definition so that the Act ‘only covers those industries that 
have been identified as vulnerable to protest action’.109 It is suggested that 
this directly discriminatory operation of the Act renders its object 
incompatible with Australia’s system of representative and responsible 
government.  
This discriminatory operation of the Act has been confirmed by its 
application – charges under the Act have only been laid against protesters 
engaging in one particular type of protest – forestry protesters. At the risk 
of quoting too heavily from the written submissions, the Plaintiffs’ written 
reply to the Defendant in Brown explains how acute the discrimination 
effected by the Act is: 
In so far as environmental protest about logging is concerned, it is artificial 
to suggest that protesting of all kinds (pro and anti-logging) is prohibited 
by the Act neutrally. As Scalia J observed in his concurring opinion in 
McCullen v Coakley, “it blinks reality say ... that a blanket prohibition on 
the use of [locations] where speech on only one politically controversial 
topic is likely to occur – and where that speech can most effectively be 
communicated – is not content based”.110  
On this point of discrimination, set against the coloured backdrop of the 
decades of environmental activism in Tasmania, Hayne J’s statement that 
the ‘very purpose of the freedom is to permit the expression of unpopular 
or minority points of view’111 is apposite. Gageler J raised this point in the 
hearing of Brown when his Honour put to Mr O’Farrell SC that the Act 
may not be compatible with the system of responsible government if it is 
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apparent that ‘the majority of electors are in favour of silencing a minority 
of electors’.112 To this end, Gageler J’s obiter dictum in Tajjour regarding 
the legitimate ends test is also highly instructive: 
The end is not legitimate unless the end is itself compatible with the 
system of representative and responsible government established by the 
Constitution. The end of quelling a political controversy or of 
handicapping political opposition would not answer that description.113 
On its face, the Act is not directed at supressing minority points of view, 
quelling a political controversy or handicapping political opposition. 
Nonetheless in its terms, operation and effect the Act has had precisely 
these effects, because there is significant uncertainty as to the scope and 
application of its offences. Indeed, deterrence of a specific type of protest 
was expressly recognised as a purpose of the Act in its Second Reading 
Speech. It is submitted that the general ‘chilling effect’114 this had had on 
political and environmental protest that is not directed at ‘intentionally 
shut[ting] down and harm[ing] Tasmanian business’115 means the Act does 
not serve an object compatible with the Australian system of responsible 
government.  
3 Conduct targeted by the Act already regulated by 13 coextensive criminal 
offences and torts with penalties set at lower thresholds for these existing 
offences 
The operative effect of the four principal types of offence created by the 
Act is to criminalise various forms of protest that have a physical nexus 
with business premises and a temporal nexus with the carrying out of 
business activities. A key argument militating against the Act having a 
legitimate end is that there are at least 13 coextensive summary and 
indictable offences and common law torts which already operate to target 
and criminalise to at least some degree the conduct proscribed by the Act. 
As such, it follows from this wide overlap of targeted conduct that it is 
plausible that the Act is not directed at its stated objectives. These 
coextensive offences and torts are tabulated in Appendix A below. It is 
suggested that the penalties prescribed by the Act, for offences that target 
very similar conduct to these existing criminal offences, are much more 
severe, raising the question of why ‘political, environmental, social, 
cultural or economic’116 protesting attracts significantly heavier penalties. 
As reasoned by Toohey and Gummow JJ in Levy, the ‘attachment of a 
penalty is a significant matter in the assessment of the validity of such a 
law’117 under the Lange test.  
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Three salient points arise from this comparison that go to the heart of 
whether the Act has a legitimate object compatible with the system of 
representative government. First, any free-standing area of operation which 
the Act carves out and targets is necessarily narrow in scope (for example, 
the carved-out conduct is a protester preventing, hindering or obstructing a 
business activity while effecting the unlawful trespass under the s 6(4) and 
6(1) offence). Second, as exemplified by offences numbered 1–4 and 7, the 
existing penalty range is set at a much lower threshold – it follows that the 
Act’s imposition of high pecuniary fines and terms of imprisonment must 
be for the purpose of effecting general deterrence of such protest, as stated 
by the Minister in the Second Reading Speech. Third, it is open on a 
forensic examination of the conduct targeted by the Act’s four principal 
offences to argue that, in reality, the purported ends of the Act are already 
being served by Tasmania’s coextensive criminal offences and torts.  
4 In favour of validity – ‘effect’ versus ‘overall purpose’  
An opposing argument to any attempt by the Plaintiffs to characterise the 
Act’s true purpose as illegitimate, or impute a collateral statutory purpose, 
is reliance on the reasoning of the plurality in McCloy. The plaintiffs in 
McCloy argued that the ‘true’ purpose behind the legislation was to ‘deny 
funding to electoral activity by a party, candidate or elected member.’118 
The Court did not agree, finding that s 4A(c) of the impugned Act in 
McCloy relevantly provided its purpose was the prevention of ‘corruption 
and undue influence in the government of the State’.119  
The critical passage from French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ is: 
The plaintiffs’ submission, that the relevant provisions of the 
EFED Act have as their true purpose the removal of the ability 
of persons to make large donations in the pursuit of political 
influence, would appear to confuse the effect of Div 2A, and 
other measures employed, with the overall purpose of these 
provisions.120   
That is, there was a difference between each provision’s ‘effect’ and 
‘overall purpose’. The significance of this reasoning is that it directly 
addresses the submission by the plaintiffs in McCloy that the impugned 
provisions there had a ‘true’121 purpose that was different or collateral to 
the express purpose stated by that Act’s objects clause. 
Applying this reasoning about a differentiation between ‘effect’ and 
‘overall purpose’ to the Tasmanian Act, the line of argument in favour of 
validity is to uphold the orthodox construction of the Act’s purpose, 
namely to protect businesses from damage and disruption due to protesters. 
Following this, applying the plurality’s reasoning in McCloy, the argument 
                                                     
118  Ibid.  
119  Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) s 4A(c).  
120  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 205 [40] (emphasis in original).  
121  Ibid 203 [32], 205 [40].  
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runs that, just because the Act has had the effect of deterring protest, this 
does not mean that the ‘overall purpose’ of the Act is directed at general 
deterrence of political and environmental protest. As such, it is open to 
argue that the Act does not operate to criminalise protesting simpliciter and 
is very specific in its operation. This is for the key reason that, for the ss 6 
and 8 offences, an element of the offence is that the protester ‘prevents, 
hinders or obstructs access’ to a business premises or business access area. 
This external element of the offence restricts the scope of those offences 
and therefore, so the argument runs, does not evince a purpose to deter 
protesting generally, or protests that do not seek to shut down business 
operations. In Brown, this argument in favour of validity was made by Mr 
Bleby SC when he submitted that: 
So when the plaintiff submits that the true purpose of this legislation is the 
prevention of onsite political protests, the answer must be, in my respectful 
submission, the same as was given in McCloy at paragraph 40 by the 
plurality - that is, that this would appear to confuse or conflate the effect of 
the law with the overall purpose of the provisions.122 
5 In favour of validity – invalidating individual provisions versus the 
legitimacy of the entire Act’s object  
A second argument in favour of validity is that there is a qualitative 
distinction between: (i) finding two individual provisions in an Act lack a 
legitimate purpose not connected to the Act’s overall purpose, as in Unions 
NSW (where the overall purpose of the Act is legitimate); and (ii) any 
attempt here to characterise the entire purpose of the Act as not directed at 
a legitimate end compatible with Australia’s constitutional system of 
government. The latter is a more onerous challenge and confronts the 
opposing argument of ‘effect’ versus ‘overall purpose’ explained above.  
6 In favour of validity – the Act does not restrict protests per se  
A third argument support the Act’s validity is one that featured heavily in 
Tasmania’s and the interveners’ submissions.123 Cast in a variety of ways, 
essentially this argument is that the ss 6 and 8 offences in the Act only 
operate to restrict protest that has the prescribed effect on business activity 
and do not target and restrict political protests per se. The temporal and 
geographic restrictions support the view that the Act evinces a very specific 
purpose: to protect workplaces from damage and disruption due to protest. 
                                                     
122 Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 May 
2017) 7150. For the avoidance of doubt, please note that this discussion of ‘effect’ 
versus ‘overall purpose’ appeared in the author’s original honours manuscript.  
123  See the State of Tasmania, ‘Defendant’s Submissions’, Submissions in Brown v The 
State of Tasmania, H3/2016, 21 March 2017, [75], [48]. See particularly the State of 
Victoria, ‘Annotated Submissions of the Attorney-General of Victoria (Intervening)’, 
Submissions in Brown v The State of Tasmania, H3/2016, 28 March 2017, [22]–[28] 
and the Commonwealth, ‘Annotated Submissions of the Attorney-General for the 
Commonwealth (Intervening)’, Submissions in Brown v The State of Tasmania, 
H3/2016, 28 March 2017, [61]. For the avoidance of doubt, this section concerning per 
se protest was inserted after Brown’s hearing. 
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That the Act does not operate on protest at large also means the impugned 
provisions align closely with the similar protest offences found to be valid 
in Kerrison and O’Flaherty on the basis of public safety concerns.   
VI    APPLYING LANGE’S SECOND LIMB SECOND ARM: IS THE ACT 
REASONABLY APPROPRIATE AND ADAPTED TO ACHIEVE THE 
LEGITIMATE PURPOSE? (THREE-STAGE PROPORTIONALITY 
TESTING) 
A   McCloy’s Structured Proportionality Testing 
In McCloy, the plurality clarified what is required by the second arm of the 
second limb of the Lange test. Their Honours did so by laying down a test 
of structured proportionality to determine whether an impugned law is 
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance’ its ‘legitimate object’.124 
As such, the Act must now meet the three new separate criteria of validity, 
which were explained by the plurality as follows: 
suitable — as having a rational connection to the purpose of the 
provision; 
necessary — in the sense that there is no obvious and 
compelling alternative, reasonably practicable means of 
achieving the same purpose which has a less restrictive effect 
on the freedom; 
adequate in its balance — a criterion requiring a value 
judgment, consistently with the limits of the judicial function, 
describing the balance between the importance of the purpose 
served by the restrictive measure and the extent of the 
restriction it imposes on the freedom.125 
These propounded criteria of whether a law is reasonably appropriate and 
adapted are the latest evolution in the Court’s evolving implied freedom 
jurisprudence, and represent a narrower, more prescriptive approach that 
was favoured by a bare majority of the Court. It remains to be seen how 
the retirement of French CJ (as a member of the bare majority) and the 
appointment of Edelman J will affect the composition of this majority.  
Conversely, Lange’s wider formulation of ‘reasonably appropriate and 
adapted’ was broadly preferred by Gageler J,126 Nettle J127 and Gordon J.128 
Indeed, Gageler J in McCloy stood in stark opposition to the plurality, 
reasoning that this new structured proportionality test was the ‘wholesale 
                                                     
124  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 193–5 [2], 201 [24].  
125  Ibid 195 [3]. 
126  Ibid 234 [140]. 
127  Ibid 259 [225].  
128  Ibid 282 [311].  
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importation … of proportionality analysis’129 drawn from foreign 
constitutional jurisprudence. Nettle J was also retrospect, not explicitly 
approving either the plurality’s or Gageler J’s approach but finding that 
‘[i]t is enough to observe that each approach involves questions of 
judgment’,130 while applying the orthodox formulation of reasonably 
appropriate and adapted. Gordon J was also reticent about the introduction 
of structured proportionality, preferring to maintain the two-step Lange test 
because: [t]he method or structure of reasoning to which the plurality refers 
does not yield in this case an answer any different from that reached by the 
accepted modes of reasoning.’131  
The plurality’s formulation has already attracted much commentary,132 and 
has been applied at least twice.133 At its heart, this stage of the Lange test 
requires a justification of the burden on the freedom as evaluated against 
the Act’s legitimate purpose. On this new approach of the bare majority, 
the Act must now sequentially satisfy three independent criteria to be found 
valid. 
1 Suitability 
The crux of the ‘suitability’ inquiry is the determination of whether the 
means the impugned provision(s) employs has a ‘rational connection to the 
purpose of the provision’.134 The plurality in McCloy at this stage of the 
                                                     
129  Ibid 234 [140]. Gageler J raised two principal concerns with the importation: (i) that 
the criteria of suitability and necessity are too wide and fail to take into account both 
the ‘subject matter of the law’ and the extent of the restriction on the freedom, ‘no 
matter how large or small, focused or incidental’ it may be (at 235 [142]); and (ii) the 
‘adequate in its balance’ criterion does not properly reflect the ‘reasons for the 
implication of the constitutional freedom’ (at 236 [145]). 
130  Ibid 259 [225].  
131  Ibid 282 [311]. 
132  See Keith Mason, ‘The use of proportionality in Australian constitutional law’ (2016) 
27 Public Law Review 109; Carter, above n 59; Anne Twomey, ‘Proportionality and 
the Constitution’ (Speech delivered at ALRC Freedoms Symposium, Federal Court, 
Queens Square, Sydney, 8 October 2015); Murray Wesson, ‘Crafting a concept of 
deference for the implied freedom of political communication’ (2016) 27 Public Law 
Review 87; Chordia, above n 54; Scott Stephenson, ‘McCloy Symposium: Scott 
Stephenson on the Complications and Consequences of Constitutional Comparison’ 
on Opinions on High (2 November 2015) 
<http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2015/11/02/stephenson-mccloy>; Kristen 
Walker, ‘Justice Hayne and the implied freedom of political communication’ (2015) 26 
Public Law Review 292; James Stellios, ‘Marbury v Madison: Constitutional 
limitations and statutory discretions’ (2016) 42 Australian Bar Review 324, 347–8.  
133  Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] FCAFC 41 (8 March 2017) [91]–[92]; 
Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) (2015) 237 FCR 188, 255–6 [284]. 
McCloy’s structured proportionality was referred to in Griffin v Council of Law Society 
of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 275 (29 September 2016) at [85] as the relevant 
test to be applied, but Sackville AJA (with whom Ward and Gleeson JJA agreed) 
found it was unnecessary to determine whether the implied freedom operated in that 
case. See also Murphy v Electoral Commissioner [2016] HCA 36 (5 September 2016) 
[37].  
134  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 193–5 [3]. 
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proportionality inquiry thus imposed a threshold test to ensure that the 
provision(s) is actually directed to the legitimate end of the law,135 citing 
the reasoning of the plurality in Unions NSW.136 In Unions NSW, the 
plurality reasoned that this rational purpose inquiry is focused on what the 
impugned provision(s) ‘seeks to achieve’.137 Hayne J in Tajjour further 
articulated the rational connection inquiry as being directed at ‘realisation’; 
that is, ‘[t]o accept that the law is rationally connected to a legitimate end 
is to accept that the means adopted by the law are capable of realising that 
end.’138  
A key argument against the Act being a suitable choice for effecting its 
purpose is that its means are functionally dislocated from its purpose of 
ensuring that business operations are not interrupted, because it specifically 
and deliberately targets ‘protesters’ instead of ‘persons’. This functional 
dislocation occurs because the Act could have achieved the object of 
preventing persons on business premises or business access areas from 
preventing, hindering or obstructing business activities simply by referring 
to ‘persons’ and not expressly targeting ‘protesters’ instead (for example, 
as argued above it could have contained a non-exhaustive definition of 
persons as including ‘protesters’).  
By parity of reasoning with the plurality’s decision in Unions NSW, it is 
submitted that the exclusive targeting of protesters appears similarly 
dislocated and disconnected as were s 96D’s means, for the reason that it 
is unclear what exactly the Act here seeks to achieve by targeting protest 
over and above persons (as at this stage, the orthodox purpose must be 
accepted as having been found legitimate). Framing this argument in the 
negative, and adopting Hayne J’s language of ‘realisation’, the exclusion 
of ‘persons’ from being an element of the protesting offences means that 
an array of conduct (such as the three examples given above) that may be 
as harmful to business as protesting is excluded from the Act’s operation, 
bringing into question whether the offences are capable of ‘realising’ the 
Act’s object. However, this argument concerning the dislocation and 
disconnection of the Act’s means is met with considerable force by the 
point made by Mr Donaghue QC intervening for the Commonwealth in 
Brown. Mr Donaghue QC, when making submissions concerning 
rationality, directly addressed the dislocated means argument in his 
submission that ‘[t]he fact that other people are causing damages to 
business does not mean that it is irrational to focus on the subset selected 
here.’139   
                                                     
135  See also Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 562 [78] (Hayne J). 
136  Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 558–9 [55]–[56].  
137  Ibid 559 [56]. 
138  See also Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 562 [78] (Hayne J) (emphasis added). 
139  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) 5365.  
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As such, because the suitability stage only requires a basic rational 
connection between the impugned provision’s (or entire law’s) effect and 
legitimate purpose, the arguments in favour of the satisfaction of the 
suitability inquiry are qualitatively stronger. There are two key arguments 
in addition to Mr Donaghue QC’s reply in relation to dislocated means. 
First, the offences contain a geographic restriction that the Act applies to 
both ‘business premises’ and ‘business access areas’. As such, the Act 
operates on businesses but does not extend to other geographic locations, 
such as protest outside residential areas.140 Second, the broad scope of the 
offences in its application to ‘protesters’ is calibrated to realising its stated 
object of protecting all workplaces from damage and disruption because 
workplaces vary considerably in nature.   
Weighing these lines of argument, it is likely that if the end of protecting 
workplaces from damage and disruption due to protesters is found to be 
legitimate, then the Act is suitable to rationally effect its means under this 
first stage of the proportionality test.  
2 Necessity 
The second criterion of validity requires consideration of whether there are 
any ‘obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably practical means of 
achieving the same purpose’141 which have a less restrictive effect on the 
implied freedom. As reasoned by the McCloy plurality,142 the qualification 
of ‘obvious and compelling’ means that this criterion is ‘merely a tool of 
analysis’143 (as opposed to a ‘higher rule’ derived from the Constitution as 
with the legitimate ends determination), thereby ensuring the Court does 
not substitute its own determination for that of the legislature’s, with 
respect to the selection of the measure used to effectuate legislative 
purpose.144 
The Act will satisfy the necessity criterion if it can be shown that the 
legislative purpose could not be achieved by reliance on the existing 
offences and common law torts. As explained by Crennan, Kiefel and Bell 
JJ in Tajjour, the alternative ‘must be as effective in achieving the 
legislative purpose.’145 As such, Tasmania’s argument in favour of validity 
is that the existing offences have not successfully deterred protest because: 
(i) they cannot target the specific conduct criminalised by the Act (most 
                                                     
140  See also Aroney and Finlay, above n 12, 70. Cf the very narrow scope of the 
geographical restriction in O’Flaherty (2014) 221 FCR 382 at 387, which was limited 
only to Martin Place in Sydney.  
141  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 193–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
142  See also Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 214 [347] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
143  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 211 [58] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
144  Ibid 217 [81]–[82]. See also Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 52–3 [100] (McHugh J).  
145  Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 572 [114]. Although note Gageler J’s question to Mr 
Donaghue QC on day two of Brown’s hearing – ‘Why does it have to be as effective? 
Does it always have to be as effective?’: Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State 
of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 May 2017) 5520.  
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prominently the conduct of preventing, hindering or obstructing business 
activities on business access areas); and/or (ii) the bulk of the existing 
offences are summary offences with lower-range pecuniary penalties only 
(for example, offences 4 and 9 in Appendix A) or short maximum jail 
sentences (for example, offences 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix A). Thus, on this 
line of argument, the higher penalties and carving-out of aggressive forms 
of protest that result in economic harm to businesses as indictable offences 
are the only effective means of achieving the Act’s legitimate end.  
Conversely, a key challenge to the Act’s necessity (which is potentially 
fatal) would be to demonstrate the existing criminal offences and torts (as 
discussed above and tabulated in Appendix A) render the Act’s offences 
redundant as a superfluous means of achieving its purpose. The coexistence 
of at least 13 other criminal offences and common law torts targeting very 
similar conduct assists the Court under the necessity stage of determining 
whether the Act is ‘appropriately tailored to its goal (the ‘end’) with 
minimum collateral impact.’146 The Act has arguably not minimised its 
collateral impact because it directly restricts the freedom, due to the wide 
definition of business access area but more fundamentally, by operating on 
protest at large instead of narrow acts by persons that prevent or hinder 
business activities (with prosecutions for such conduct arguably available 
under offences numbered 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 in Appendix A). On this point, 
Aroney and Finlay argue that a factor favouring validity in the 
proportionality analysis is that the ss 6 and 7 offences contain specific 
carve-outs for activities that will not qualify as protest, such as processions, 
marches and events. However, the extant offence numbered 8 in Appendix 
A is coextensive with these carve-outs, because it requires a permit for 
holding such activities.  
3 Adequate in its balance  
The cornerstone of the new structured proportionality analysis is the 
criterion that the impugned law must be ‘adequate in its balance’. As 
explained by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in McCloy, the 
‘adequate in its balance’ stage mandates a value judgment of whether the 
burden on the implied freedom is ‘undue’.147 This judicial balancing 
exercise requires a consideration of not only the ‘extent’148 of the burden 
on the freedom, but crucially, it also expressly requires the Court to 
evaluate the ‘public importance of the purpose sought to be achieved.’149 
Here, the importance of the public purpose of preventing economic loss 
through interference with business by protesters must be weighed against 
the Act’s direct burden on the freedom.  
                                                     
146  Chordia, above n 54.  
147  McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 218 [86].   
148  Ibid.  
149  Ibid.   
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The principal argument militating against the Act being ‘adequate in its 
balance’ is that, even though at this stage the Act has been found to have a 
legitimate object, the burden on the freedom is too great, and ‘undue’,150 
because it directly criminalises political protest. This is anathema to 
Australia’s constitutional system of representative and responsible 
government. The aggravation in the Act that renders the burden undue, and 
therefore justified on this line of argument, is the default categorisation of 
protest as an indictable crime when balanced against the object of 
preventing economic loss to workplaces. Aroney and Finlay concede in 
their proportionality analysis that in Levy, the ‘“importance” of the 
legislative object (prevention of injury or death) was greater than that of 
the Tasmania law (protection of business activities)’.151 
McHugh J’s reasoning in Coleman is highly instructive on this first point 
of balancing the public importance of the Act’s object versus its restriction 
on the freedom. McHugh J reasoned that: 
laws that burden such a communication by seeking to achieve a 
social objective unrelated to the system of representative and 
responsible government will be invalid, pro tanto, unless the 
objective of the law can be restrictively interpreted in a way that 
is compatible with the constitutional freedom.152 
McHugh J went on to give an example of such pro tanto invalidity. His 
Honour reasoned that a law that banned all political communications for 
the object of national security would be invalid unless the system of 
representative government was ‘so threatened by an external or internal 
threat’ that such a blanket prohibition was a reasonably appropriate and 
adapted means of ‘maintaining the system’.153 By parity of reasoning, here 
the object of the law (protecting economic loss in workplaces due to 
interference by protesters) is an object unrelated to the system of 
representative and responsible government (as opposed to an object such 
as that in Unions NSW or McCloy of preventing corruption in the electoral 
process – indeed, the latter’s object even operated to ‘preserve and 
enhance’154 representative government). It follows that here, unless the 
public object of preventing such economic loss to workplaces is 
qualitatively more important than allowing people to protest on political 
and governmental matters to ensure the functioning of the system, the Act’s 
restriction on the freedom is unjustified and should be rendered invalid. 
This is because protest goes to the heart of participation in the system of 
                                                     
150  Ibid.    
151  Aroney and Finlay, above n 12, 70.  
152  Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 52 [98]. 
153  Ibid. See also the same example given in McCloy by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane 
JJ who at 218 [84] stated that ‘some statutory objects may justify a very large incursion 
on the freedom’.  
154   McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 208 [47]. 
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representative and responsible government, as it voices dissent on matters 
concerning the election of State and Federal representatives.  
Second, the Act is not adequate in its balance because, even if it is conceded 
that it carves out a free-standing area of operation and thus operates on 
conduct unable to be regulated by other criminal laws (that is, it satisfies 
the necessity stage because it targets obstructing or hindering business 
resulting in economic loss), the prescribed penalties are properly 
characterised as both excessively harsh for the act of political protest and 
disproportionate to the attainment of the Act’s object. In O’Flaherty, one 
of the analogous protesting cases, the maximum penalty prescribed was 
$1,100.  
Third, the Act can be contrasted to the Regulations impugned in Levy, 
which, as found by Toohey and Gaudron JJ, did not ‘have, as their direct 
operation, the denial of the exercise of the constitutional freedom in a 
significant respect.’155 The clear implication from this passage is that the 
incidental restriction of the implied freedom (in concert with the temporal 
and geographic restrictions discussed below) in Levy was enough to save 
the laws from invalidity. Here, however, the Act directly targets political 
communication and denies people the ability to engage in communication 
about governmental matters. These restrictions imposed by the Act are 
therefore more difficult to justify than the incidental regulation in Levy.  
On this point of direct and indirect burdens, Mason CJ in ACTV156 
distinguished between laws that restrict an ‘activity or mode of 
                                                     
155  Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 614.  
156 (1992) 177 CLR 106. It should be noted that Mason CJ’s distinction between laws that 
restrict communication by reference to the character of ideas and those that do not has 
been the subject of criticism in later cases. See: Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Tajjour 
(2014) 254 CLR 508 at [132]; French CJ in Tajjour at [37] (‘[t]hose categories of laws 
do not attract different levels of scrutiny in the application of the criteria of validity’); 
and Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530 at 555 [40] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ). Recognising these conflicting statements of law, Nettle J in McCloy 
expressly stated at [221] that a ‘degree of uncertainty has arisen as to several aspects of 
the second limb of the Lange test. Those aspects include whether the standard of 
appropriateness and adaptedness varies according to the nature and extent of the 
burden…’. His Honour however then went on to find at [221] that this question has an 
affirmative answer and that ‘it should now be accepted that the standard of 
appropriateness and adaptedness does vary according to the nature and extent of the 
burden. A law that imposes a discriminatory burden will require a strong justification.’ 
While this point has not been settled by a clear majority of the Court, Nettle J’s recent 
reasoning means that it is still open to rely on Mason CJ’s distinction in ACTV as a 
legitimate mode of analysis. In favour of Nettle J’s reasoning, see also: Wotton v State 
of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 at 16 [30] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan 
and Bell JJ) and Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at 555 [95] (Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See further Mr Dunning QC’s submissions for 
Queensland in Brown which focused extensively on this point: Transcript of 
Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 May 2017) 
[6090]–[6305] and Mr Niall QC for Victoria at [6630].  
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communication’157 versus laws that restrict communication ‘by 
reference to the character of the ideas or information’158 – with the latter 
being ‘extremely difficult to justify’159 under the implied freedom. The 
first obstacle the challenge the Act faces in respect of Mason CJ’s 
categorisation is that, on its face, the Act appears to operate only on an 
‘activity or mode of communication’ (and not ‘content’) because, so the 
argument runs, it is certain behaviours (and not ‘ideas or information’ 
per se) that are criminalised. In response to this point, it is submitted 
that the type of behaviour criminalised by the Act (protest on a 
‘political, environmental, social, cultural or economic’ issue which has 
the prescribed effect on business activity) is an activity or mode of 
communication that, by its very nature as protest, is intrinsically linked 
to the expression of ideas or information of a particular character; as 
such, it does restrict ideas and information. So much was expressly 
recognised by Brennan CJ in Levy, who held that ‘actions as well as 
words can communicate ideas.’160 
This paper takes the next step in Mason CJ’s distinction and submits 
that the Act also restricts communication by reference to the ‘content’ 
of that protest. This is because the practical operation and effect of the 
Act is that it has only been used against anti-logging protesters. This 
means that, when viewed in light of the history of environmental protest 
in Tasmania, it is submitted that in reality the Act does target and 
restrict communication by reference to the character of ideas or 
information.161 Gageler J encapsulated this argument during the hearing 
of Brown when his Honour put to Mr Dunning QC (appearing for the 
State of Queensland) that the: 
characterisation of the burden which as applied to this case could 
possibly be that of a discriminatory law – that is, a law that focuses 
on, is targeted towards political communication and nothing but 
political communication, and that as so targeted is content based – 
that is, it favours or disfavours a particular political point of view 
in its practical operation.162   
Fourth, the Act’s restriction on political communication is not subject to 
any temporal restriction – that is, unlike in Levy, which was ‘strictly limited 
in place and time’.163 Similarly, in Muldoon where the laws were held 
valid, the temporal restriction imposed by the impugned law was limited to 
                                                     
157  ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 143.  
158  Ibid.  
159  Ibid.  
160   Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594. 
161  See also Robert Brown and Jessica Hoyt, ‘Plaintiffs’ Submissions’, Submissions in 
Brown v The State of Tasmania, H3/2016, 27 February 2017, [41]–[43]. 
162  Transcript of Proceedings, Brown v The State of Tasmania [2017] HCATrans 94 (3 
May 2017) [6215]. 
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prohibiting camping overnight – protesters were free to use the gardens at 
all other times.164 
Fifth, in response to any opposing argument that people can protest in other 
places that are not business premises or business access areas, McHugh J’s 
reasoning in Levy is apposite.165 McHugh J held: 
It is beside the point that their arguments against the alleged cruelty of duck 
shooting could have been put by other means during the periods when the 
Regulations operated. What the Regulations did was to prevent them from 
putting their message in a way that they believed would have the greatest 
impact on public opinion and which they hoped would eventually bring 
about the end of the shooting of game birds.166 
That is, McHugh J reasoned that the very point of protesting at a particular 
location is to ‘maximise their opportunity to influence public opinion’167 
by showing televised broadcasts of the protest where the location is central 
to the subject of the protest. This is particularly relevant to environmental 
protest in Tasmania, as such televised broadcasts aided the campaign to 
save the Franklin River in the 1980s for example. 
VII   CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is argued that the Act is constitutionally invalid under the 
Lange test. Its criminalisation of political protest impermissibly burdens 
the implied freedom of political communication because: (i) it fails for 
want of legitimate legislative purpose compatible with the Australian 
system of representative and responsible government; or (ii) alternatively, 
it is not either necessary or adequate in its balance, due to the undue burden 
it places on the freedom, by creating default indictable offences that punish 
only protesters and not persons. The primary argument made in this is 
paper is the Act does not pursue a legitimate legislative purpose because: 
(i) its expressly targets ‘political’ and ‘environmental’ protest, which has 
had a ‘chilling’ effect on protest that is not directed at damaging business 
or hindering business operations, and may have as its ‘true’ purpose the 
object of silencing dissent; (ii) its operation and application is 
discriminatory, as it specifically protects ‘mining’, ‘forestry’, ‘agricultural’ 
and ‘manufacturing’ workplaces from protest, impermissibly distorting the 
flow of political communication; and (iii) there are at least 13 existing 
coextensive criminal offences and torts which regulate very similar 
conduct, rendering the Act’s offences redundant. It is hoped that the Court 
will take the opportunity to invalidate the Act on the basis of this 
incompatibility.  
                                                     
164  Muldoon (2013) 217 FCR 450, 528 [384].  
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF OFFENCES 
 
 
1 S13(3AA) 
POA: 
 
Public 
annoyance 
Disturbing the 
peace in public 
place: s 13(1)(b). 
 
Committing a 
nuisance: s 
13(1)(e).  
Maximum 3 penalty 
units168 ($471) or 
maximum 3 months’ jail 
(doubled if two offences 
under s 13(1) within 6 
months).  
 
Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(3)).  
Maximum 
$10 000 fine 
per offence 
and then 4 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for a ‘further 
offence’. 
2 S14B(1) 
POA: 
 
Unlawful 
entry onto 
land   
Entering or 
remaining on land, 
building, structure 
or premises without 
consent of owner or 
occupier.  
Maximum 25 penalty units 
($3925) or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 
months. 
Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(1)).  
Ibid.   
Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(2)). 
Ibid.  
3 Section 
37(1) POA  
 
Injury to 
property 
A person shall not 
unlawfully destroy 
or injure any 
property. 
Maximum 10 penalty units 
($1 570) OR up to 12 
months’ imprisonment.  
Section 7(1). 
 
Maximum 
$50 000 or 
imprisonment 
for a term not 
exceeding 5 
years, or 
both. 
4 S22 Forest 
Management 
Act 2013 
(Tas) 
 
Request to 
leave 
permanent 
timber 
production 
zone land  
 
An authorised 
officer may request 
a person not to 
enter permanent 
timber zone 
production land, or 
a forest road, or to 
leave either of 
those areas, or 
cease to undertake 
an acitivity or 
engage in conduct 
on that land or 
road.  
Forest road is 
defined in s 3 as 
constructed or 
maintained by or 
for the Forest 
Manager either 
inside or outside 
permanent timber 
production zone 
land; or any other 
road on permanent 
timber production 
zone land, other 
than; or any other 
road that is on 
Crown land.  
Maximum 20 penalty units 
($3 140). 
Section 8 
(‘business 
access area’ 
offence).  
Maximum 
$10 000 fine. 
5 Section 
276AA 
Code: 
 
False 
threats of 
danger 
Making a statement 
known to be false 
from which it can 
be inferred that 
some act has been 
or likely to be done 
that may give rise 
to serious risk of 
Up to 21 years’ 
imprisonment (Code 
389(3)) but in practice 
sentences are non-custodial 
(eg, community service 
orders).169  
Section 7(3). 
 
 
Ibid. 
 
                                                     
168  A penalty unit is $157 in Tasmania for the period 1 July 2016–30 June 2017. 
169  Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 384.  
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danger to persons 
or property.  
6 S140/S141  
Code: 
 
Common 
Nuisance  
Unlawful act that 
endangers life, 
safety, health, 
property or comfort 
of the public or by 
which public are 
obstructed in 
exercise of 
common right of 
enjoyment.  
(Note: this is a 
statutory 
codification of the 
common law tort of 
public nuisance)  
1. Upon conviction a Court 
may adjourn case so that 
the convicted person can 
abate or remove nuisance; 
2. Pay a fine equal to the 
amount of removing 
nuisance (s 388A Code).  
3. Imprisonment of any 
length under (s 388B 
Code).  
Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(2)) on 
‘business 
access area’.  
 
Maximum 
$10 000 fine 
per offence 
and then 4 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for a ‘further 
offence’. 
7 S15B POA: 
 
Dispersal of 
persons 
Police officer may 
direct person to 
leave a public place 
for at least 4 hours 
if the police officer 
believes that the 
person is 
obstructing or is 
likely to obstruct 
the movement of 
pedestrians or 
vehicles (s 
15B(1)(b)) or is 
likely to endanger 
the safety of any 
other person or is 
likely to commit a 
breach of the 
peace.   
Maximum 2 penalty units 
($314).  
Section 8 (for 
contravention 
of s 6(3)).  
Maximum 
$10 000 fine. 
8 S49AB 
POA:  
 
Public street 
permits  
 
 
A person must not 
organise or conduct 
a demonstration 
held wholly or 
partly on a public 
street unless she or 
he has a permit.  
 
Demonstration 
means a ‘march, 
rally or other kind 
of political 
demonstration’ (s 
49AA). 
Fine not exceeding 10 
penalty units  
($1 570). 
Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(3)).  
Maximum 
$10 000 fine 
per offence 
and then 4 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for a ‘further 
offence’ 
9 R236 Traffic 
(Road Rules) 
Regulations 
1999  
 
Pedestrians 
not to cause 
a traffic 
hazard or 
obstruction 
A pedestrian must 
not cause a traffic 
hazard by moving 
into the path of a 
driver or 
unreasonably 
obstruct the path of 
a driver or other 
pedestrian. 
Fine not exceeding 5 
penalty units ($785). 
Ibid and s 8 
(for 
contravention 
of s 6(3)). 
Ibid. 
9 S43 Traffic 
Act 1925:  
 
Removal of 
things 
obstructing 
public 
streets 
If an article is 
placed or left in a 
public street to the 
obstruction, 
annoyance or 
danger of other 
road users, an 
authorised person 
may remove and 
detain it. 
 
Can be sold to cover costs.  Section 9(1) 
(obstruction 
of police 
under s 12). 
Maximum 
$10 000 fine. 
10 S35 POA  
 
Assault 
 
In Williams v 
Hursey (1959) 103 
CLR 30, at 76–7 it 
was held that 
picketers who wish 
to intimidate and 
Summary offence under s 
35(1) POA: maximum 2 
penalty units or 12 months’ 
imprisonment.  
Section 7(3). Maximum 
$50 000 fine 
or 
imprisonment 
for a term not 
exceeding 5 
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assault can be 
guilty of assault.  
 
The existing 
offence falls under 
the ‘Attempting or 
gesturing to apply 
force’ s 182(1) 
Code definition 
which applies to s 
35 POA. 
 years, or 
both. 
 
11 Common 
law tort of 
trespass to 
land  
Every injustified 
entry onto land of 
another carried out 
intentionally or 
negligently is 
guilty of trespass.  
Varies.  Section 6(4) 
(contravention 
via s 6(1)).  
Maximum 
$10 000 fine 
per offence 
and then 4 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for a ‘further 
offence’ 
12 S34B(1) 
POA  
 
Obstructing 
police 
officer in 
execution of 
duty 
A person must not 
assault, resist or 
wilfully obstruct a 
police officer in the 
execution of her/his 
duty. 
Maximum fine of 100 
penalty units or a three 
years’ imprisonment.  
Section 9 
(contravention 
via s 12). 
Maximum 
$10 000 fine. 
13 Work Health 
and Safety 
Act 2012 
(Tas) 
 
S19 Primary 
Duty of 
Care 
A person 
conducting a 
business must 
ensure the health 
and safety of 
persons.  
See Div 5 – varies based on 
culpability: up to $600 000 
for businesses or 
imprisonment.  
Various 
including ss 6, 
7 and 8.  
Varied.  
 
 
 
